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By What Authority?: Reflections on the
Constitutionality and Wisdom of the
Flag Protection Act of 1989
By DAVID L. FAIGMAN*
Over 150 years ago Alexis de Tocquevile observed in his seminal
work, Democracy in America, that "I know of no country in which there
is so little independence of mind and real freedom of discussion as in
America."' The political firestorm that has followed Texas v. Johnson,2
the "flag-burning" case, demonstrates the continuing truth of Toe-
queville's words. Democracy's principal failing, Tocqueville believed, lay
in the timidity of America's leaders when confronted by the suffocating
tide of popular opinion.3 In the President and in Congress such timidity
of spirit is currently ascendant. The Flag Protection Act of 19891 (the
Act) represents a recent example of the irresolute vision of this nation's
leadership. Its passage was an effort to avoid responsibility for defending
the fundamental principle of freedom of speech against the shrill voice of
the majority, as well as to avoid the responsibility attending enactment of
a constitutional amendment.' But this effort lacks integrity, as a matter
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B.A. 1979, State University of New York, College at Oswego; M.A. (Psychology) 1984, J.D.
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I would like to thank my many colleagues who commented on drafts of this Essay. I am
especially indebted to Ray Forrester, Elizabeth C. Johnsen, William B. Lockhart, Scott E.
Sundby, and Diane E. Turriff for their thoughts and comments. This Essay builds upon my
earlier work appearing as Confronting the Tyranny of the Majority, 8 S.F. BARRISTER L.J. 3
(1989).
1. 2 A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 263 (F. Bowen rev. trans. 1945)
(Cong. ed. 1835).
2. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
3. See TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 265-68.
4. Pub. L. No. 101-131, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws (103 Stat.) 777 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700(a)).
5. See, for example, Senator Kennedy's remark in the floor debate that "[t]he proposed
statute is supported in good faith by many who see it as the only means of heading off a
constitutional amendment." 135 CONG. REC. S12576 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1989). And Senator
Grassley undoubtedly captured the mood of Congress when he observed, "I understand that
the pressure on my colleagues to support a statutory response is great. After all, who among
us can safely vote against a bill styled to protect our flag from desecration." Id. at S12587.
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of both constitutional law and political principle.
Current debate over the Act has focused on its constitutionality
under the First Amendment as well as on the wisdom of such an action
as compared to amending the Constitution. This Essay also considers
the constitutionality of the Act, but it focuses on the text of the Constitu-
tion rather than the Bill of Rights. Specifically, Congress has not de-
clared, and a search of the text of the Constitution does not reveal, the
source of power for its action. It must be, therefore, that the Act's pro-
ponents are relying on some theory, as yet unarticulated, involving the
"penumbra" 6 of Article I to support Congress' authority to protect the
flag. Yet these very proponents of flag protection adamantly reject any
similar penumbral searches in the Bill of Rights. It is inconsistent for
adherents to the original intent doctrine to decry an expansive interpreta-
tion of the protections contained in the Bill of Rights while simultane-
ously advocating an expansive interpretation of the enumerated powers
expressed in Article I. This Essay argues that unless proponents of the
Act accept some theory of substantive development of the Constitution,
authority for the Act is absent from Article I. Even if Congress lacks the
power to protect the flag legislatively, however, a comparable outcome
can be achieved through constitutional amendment or, alternatively,
through state legislation in the manner of the federal Act. Because,
through one means or another, Congress or the states might still provide
safe sanctuary for the flag, this Essay concludes by examining the wis-
dom of insulating the flag from the fires of political dissent.
I. Background
If Tocqueville erred in any way in his extraordinary analysis of
American democracy, it was in underestimating the future power of the
judiciary to check the caprices of the majority. This power is eminently
observable in Johnson, in which a divided Court upheld Gregory Lee
Johnson's right under the First Amendment to express his disapproval of
6. For those uncomfortable with the term "penumbra," a term eschewed by the Court in
favor of "substantive due process," an alternative wording in the context of Article I might be
"substantive due power." I use the term penumbra in this Essay as a rhetorical device to refer
to constitutional interpretation involving the search for those values "'so rooted in the tradi-
tions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental.'" Palko v. Connecticut,
302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)); see
generally Brest, The Fundamental Rights Controversy: The Essential Contradictions of Norma-
tive Constitutional Scholarship, 90 YALE L.J. 1063 (1981). Ultimately, commentators who are
critical of the right of privacy when it is found in the penumbra of the Bill of Rights are also
critical of that right when it is found in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. This Essay is directed at those commentators who are critical of a fundamental rights
search in the Bill of Rights but who also accept a fundamental powers analysis in Article I.
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the Reagan administration by burning an American flag outside the 1984
Republican National Convention.7 With full recognition of the impor-
tance of the question and the emotions that the question elicited,8 the
Court upheld the fundamental and transcendent value of free political
expression.
The Texas statute at issue in Johnson prohibited the intentional or
knowing desecration of the American flag "in a way that the actor knows
will seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action." 9 As Texas conceded in oral argument, Johnson's action of burn-
ing the flag was expressive conduct and thus fully within the scope of the
First Amendment. 1 The First Amendment is not absolute, however,
and Texas forwarded two arguments for removing Johnson's conduct
from constitutional protection. First, Texas argued that flag-burning cre-
ated an imminent harm of a breach of the peace.11 Second, Texas as-
serted a compelling interest in preserving the flag as a symbol of
nationhood.' 2
The Court rejected Texas' claim that flag burning inevitably resulted
in breaches of the peace, pointing out that no such breach had occurred
in this case. 3 More importantly, the Court held that the mere possibility
that such a deplorable act might give offense cannot be the measure of
constitutional protection. It is political dissent intended to provoke un-
popular response in the "marketplace of ideas" that is most in need of
protection. 14
In responding to Texas' second claim, that it had an interest in pre-
serving the flag as a symbol of nationhood and national unity, the Court
marshaled its strongest arguments. As the majority noted, basic to the
First Amendment is the principle "that the Government may not pro-
hibit the expression of an idea simply because society finds the idea itself
offensive or disagreeable.""5 The First Amendment bars the government
from acting as arbiter of its citizens' ideas. Buttressing this argument,
the Court stressed that America's strength lies in its tolerance of dissent,
even dissent that impinges on views so generally embraced as to be
thought beyond reproach.6 What is more trenchant, after all, than the
7. Texas v. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. 2533, 2536-37 (1989).
8. See id. at 2547-48; id. at 2548 (Kennedy, J. concurring).
9. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon 1989).
10. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2540.
11. Id. at 2540.
12. Id. at 2542.
13. Id. at 2541.
14. Id. at 2546.
15. Id. at 2544.
16. Id. at 2547.
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spectacle of a political dissenter standing upon the pulpit of the First
Amendment claiming that America does not tolerate dissent. By burn-
ing the American flag, Gregory Lee Johnson inadvertently illustrated,
better than a thousand Fourth of July rockets, what this country stands
for.
Immediately following the decision, a collective outcry of condem-
nation erupted. The initial reaction was a call for a constitutional
amendment, a sentiment seconded by President Bush.17 Most legislators
followed the President's timorous lead, fearing that, otherwise, they
would find themselves drowned in the roaring political tide. In an effort
to avoid the political whirlpool of opposing a constitutional amendment,
but also to avoid the responsibility of standing against the prevailing cur-
rent, many legislators proposed, and Congress quickly passed, a statute
establishing criminal penalties for anyone who "knowingly mutilates,
defaces, bums, maintains on the floor or ground or tramples upon any
flag of the United States." 18 Unfortunately for Congress, the ship they
constructed in such haste has a leak.
II. A Federal Government of Enumerated Powers
Article I, section 1 of the Constitution provides that "[a]ll legislative
Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United
States;" 19 it does not grant all legislative power to Congress. Indeed, the
Bill of Rights was originally deemed redundant by many drafters of the
Constitution because it was generally supposed that a government of
enumerated powers could not legislate in the areas to be protected by a
Bill of Rights. As Alexander Hamilton explained, "Why declare that
things shall not be done which there is no power to do? Why, for in-
stance, should it be said that the liberty of the press shall not be re-
strained, when no power is given by which restrictions may be
imposed?""a In fact, not only was a Bill of Rights deemed superfluous, it
was considered perilous. Hamilton's argument seems prescient today:
[B]ills of rights, in the sense and to the extent in which they are
contended for, are not only unnecessary in the proposed Constitu-
tion but would even be dangerous. They would contain various
exceptions to powers which are not granted; and, on this very ac-
count, would afford a colorable pretext to claim more than were
granted. For why declare that things shall not be done which there
17. See New York Times, June 28, 1989, at 1, col. 5.
18. The Flag Protection Act of 1989, supra note 4.
19. U.S. CONST. art. I, § I (emphasis added).
20. THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 156 (A. Hamilton) (Tudor Publishing Co. ed. 1937).
Winter 1990] REFLECTIONS ON THE FLAG PROTECTION ACT 357
is no power to do?2 1
The Bill of Rights operates to check government power, not to con-
fer power onto the government. As Hamilton anticipated, this elemen-
tary principle has become blurred over time, and the powers of the
federal government today reach areas that Hamilton surely would have
found surprising. Nonetheless, though expansive, the powers of the fed-
eral government are not plenary. Thus, Congress must find a grant of
authority, either explicitly in the text or implicitly in the shadow cast by
the text, upon which to base enactment of the Flag Protection Act of
1989.22 This section examines the possible sources of this power.
A. The Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause has become the wellspring of a vast array of
federal powers. Under the Court's interpretation of the clause, it some-
times appears that Congress has the power to enact virtually any legisla-
tion. The Court has upheld Congress' power to regulate commerce in
cases where the economic effect on interstate commerce was indirect and
seemingly marginal.23 As long as the activity exerts a substantial aggre-
gate effect on interstate commerce, it may be federally regulated.24 As
Chief Justice Rehnquist has emphasized, however, "[lit would be a mis-
take to conclude that Congress' power to regulate pursuant to the Com-
merce Clause is unlimited."25
In fact, unless the Commerce Clause is unlimited, it cannot supply
the authority for federal flag protection. First, it is highly speculative
that flag burning affects interstate commerce at any level. If it does so at
all, it most likely facilitates commerce by the need for more flags. More-
over, Congress made no statement accompanying the Act or in the com-
mittee reports specifying the source of its authority as the Commerce
Clause or, for that matter, any other section of the Constitution.26 Ab-
21. Id.
22. The Johnson Court did not consider the power of Congress to legislate in this area,
nor did it need to, since a state statute was involved. The Court did observe as follows: "There
is, moreover, no indication--either in the text of the Constitution or in our cases interpreting
it-that a separate juridical category exists for the American flag alone." Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at
2546.
23. See, eg., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) (Congress could criminalize
purely intrastate "extortionate credit transactions" because of their effect on interstate com-
merce.); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 127-28 (1942) (Congress could control home wheat
production because of substantial economic effect of home consumption by many farmers.).
24. L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 310 (2d ed. 1988).
25. Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, 452 U.S. 264, 310 (1981)
(Rehnquist, C.J., concurring).
26. See S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., 1st Sess. (1989); H.R. REP. No. 231, 101st Cong.,
1st Sess. (1989). The only reference to Congress' authority in the Senate report states that
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sent some explicit statement that it was resting on its commerce powers,
the Court should not stretch plausibility to supply that statement.27 Fi-
nally, the object of the Commerce Clause is commerce, and burning flags
is simply not an economic activity. To broaden the interpretation of the
Commerce Clause to private noneconomic acts that might affect inter-
state commerce would extend Congress' power to all private acts.
B. The War Power
Another possible basis for upholding Congress' enactment of the
Act might be the war powers of Article I, section 8, subsections 11 and
15. Subsection 11 grants Congress the power "[t]o declare War, grant
Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on
Land and Water," and subsection 15 provides "for calling forth the Mili-
tia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel
Invasions." But neither individually nor together do these sections grant
to Congress the power to protect the flag within the United States.
One of the most important functions the national flag performs is to
represent the United States abroad. Inherent in Congress' power to
make war and provide for the common defense lies also the power to
direct that the American flag be carried by the military into battle and
that it accompany the military in times of peace. This authority, how-
ever, does not necessarily extend to controlling the actions of United
States citizens toward the flag at home during peacetime. No relation-
ship can be shown between protecting the flag from internal dissent dur-
ing peacetime and Congress' ability to carry out the mandate of
subsection 11.
Subsection 15 also does not provide a basis for Congress' effort to
protect the flag. Although this subsection contains the tempting lan-
guage referring to the power to "suppress insurrections," this power is
"Congress's power to protect the physical integrity of the flag has never been questioned, and
is consistent with its authority to protect symbols and landmarks." S. REP., supra, at 4. The
House report does not address the source of power for the Act.
Congress' failure to specify the source of power for the Act may be explained by the fact
that none of the debaters had any motivation for identifying authority for the Act. Traditional
"strict constructionists," though often troubled by federal power, favor flag protection in al-
most any form. Traditional "loose constructionists" have less fear of federal power, and here
sought to avoid tampering with the Bill of Rights at any cost. Hence, ideologues on both sides
leaped immediately to debate the scope of the Bill of Rights, failing to read the constitutional
text along the way.
27. See Bogen, The Hunting of the Shark An Inquiry Into the Linits of Congressional
Power Under the Commerce Clause, 8 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 187, 198 (1972) ("[W]here the
relationship of the law to interstate commerce is not readily apparent, the Court should require
Congress to relate the law to its impact on interstate transactions. This could assist in focusing
Congressional concern on the proper issues.").
[Vol. 17:353
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limited to the more parochial concern of Congress' power to call forth
the militia.28 One might speculate that when called forth, the militia
might be directed to carry the American flag, but subsection 15 cannot
reasonably be construed to grant the power Congress has asserted in or-
der to protect the flag.
It may be argued that implicit in the war power exists the power to
make the flag a national symbol, and that this power necessarily confers
the authority to protect that symbol. The existence of such inherent
powers is the subject of the next part in which I consider whether flag
protection is one of those fundamental powers discernible in Article I.
C. A Penumbra Theory of Article I
In his most recent book, Judge Bork criticizes the Johnson Court for
nullifying the manifest will of the majority of Americans by invalidating
the laws of forty-eight states and the federal government which prohib-
ited "desecration or defilement of the American flag."2 9 He appears to
base his argument, and I presume the federal power to legislate, on the
fundamental value of the flag as symbol of the United States.3" Chief
Justice Rehnquist explicated this argument in his dissent in Spence v.
Washington,3 asserting that the "true nature of the State's interest...
[is] one of preserving the flag as 'an important symbol of nationhood and
unity.... [T]he flag is a national property, and the Nation may regulate
28. See, e.g., Steams v. Wood, 236 U.S. 75 (1915); In re The Brig Amy Warwick, 67 U.S.
635 (1862); Perpich v. United States, 880 F.2d 11 (8th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
29. R. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA: THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW
126-28 (1989).
30. Id. at 128. Judge Bork has not specifically addressed the question of Congress' au-
thority to pass flag protection legislation. In comments before the House Judiciary Committee
he argued that although Johnson was incorrectly decided, it could not be avoided through
legislation. He advocated enactment of a constitutional amendment to protect the flag because
he believed the Act would not pass scrutiny under Johnson's interpretation of the First
Amendment. Bork, Flag Burning Should Be Unconstitutional, Newsday, Aug. 9, 1989, at 63
(excerpt of testimony before the Subcommittee on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the
House Judiciary Committee, August 1, 1989). Nonetheless, Judge Bork's comments clearly
indicate that he would not question Congress' power to enact such legislation if Johnson had
been decided in favor of Texas. See supra note 29 and accompanying text.
The proposed constitutional amendment endorsed by President Bush states: "The Con-
gress and the States shall have power to prohibit the physical desecration of the flag of the
United States." In this form, the amendment confers power onto Congress in the manner of
Article I, but is ambiguous as to its effect on the First Amendment. Ironically, therefore, this
amendment would resolve the present criticism over Congress' authority to protect the flag,
but leaves unresolved the issue so far the subject of most debate: the effect of the First Amend-
ment on efforts to protect the flag. See Hearings on Measures to Protect the Physical Integrity
of the American Flag: Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee, 101st Cong., 1st Sess.
549-55 (1989) (testimony of Walter Dellinger).
31. 418 U.S. 405 (1974).
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those who would make, imitate, sell, possess, or use it.' ,,32 Nevertheless,
the principle of the national flag as the symbol of nationhood is not
explicit in the Constitution; this suggests that specific guarantees in Arti-
cle I have "penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that
help give them life and substance.",
33
But identifying powers within the penumbra of Article I is fraught
with difficulties. Principal among these is the lack of textual guidance. If
the power is not contained in the text, how can we be sure it is justified?
Judge Bork has made this very argument, but in another context:
[T]he choice of "fundamental values" by the Court cannot be justi-
fied. Where constitutional materials do not clearly specify the
value to be preferred, there is no principled way to prefer any
claimed human value to any other. The judge must stick close to
the text and the history, and their fair implications, and not con-
struct new rights.34
If the power to protect the flag were to be recognized, how should
the scope of that power be ascertained? Again, Judge Bork made the
point well: "We are left with no idea of the sweep of the [right] and
hence no notion of the cases to which it may or may not be applied in the
future."'3 1 In Johnson, Justice Brennan echoed Judge Bork's concern:
To conclude that the Government may permit designated symbols
to be used to communicate only a limited set of messages would be
to enter territory having no discernible or defensible boundaries.
Could the Government, on this theory, prohibit the burning of
state flags? Of copies of the Presidential Seal? Of the
Constitution?36
When the Court protects "fundamental values" not explicitly enu-
merated in the text of the Constitution, it is susceptible to the criticism of
acting as a super legislature. Judge Bork has repeatedly warned that
when the Court fails to abide by those neutral principles specified in the
Constitution, it simply substitutes its own value preferences for those of
the majority.37 This is an illegitimate practice in a democratic society.
38
32. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 421-22 (1974) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quot-
ing Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 587 (1974) (White, J., concurring)); see also Goguen, 415
U.S. at 586-87 (White, J., concurring) ("[i1t is well within the powers of Congress to adopt and
prescribe a national flag and to protect the integrity of that flag.... [The] flag is an important
symbol of nationhood and unity ... ").
33. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965).
34. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 8
(1971) (criticizing the Griswold Court's identification of the right of privacy in the penumbra of
the Bill of Rights).
35. Bork, supra note 30, at 9.
36. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
37. Bork, supra note 30, at 3.
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In Bowers v. Hardwick,39 the Court, in an opinion by Justice White,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor and
Powell, refused to extend the right of privacy to consensual adult homo-
sexual conduct on this very basis: "The Court is most vunerable and
comes nearest to illegitimacy when it deals with judge-made constitu-
tional law having little or no cognizable roots in the language or design of
the Constitution." *
Yet the Court has often stepped into the mire and selected out for
special protection certain values not explicitly stated in the Constitution.
In fact, every member of the present Court has accepted at one time or
another the need to supplement the express words of the Constitution.41
Perhaps we should have more confidence in the Court's ability to identify
38. Id. at 1-2.
39. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
40. Id. at 194.
41. Justice Brennan's view that the Bill of Rights is broader than the guarantees expressed
therein is well known. See Brennan, Color-Blind, Creed Blind, Status Blind, Sex-Blind, It's All
There, In the Fourteenth Amendment. But Why Are These Principles Under Relentless Attack
Today?, 14 HUM. RTS. No. 2, 30 (1987). Justice Blackmun similarly accepts a broad vision of
the Constitution, as reflected in his majority opinion in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), in
which he concluded "that the right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision" made
by a woman. Id. at 154. Chief Justice Rehnquist has also recognized the need to supplement
the Constitution. In fact, in his dissent in Roe, 410 U.S. at 172-73, he stated that the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment "embraces more than the rights found in the Bill of
Rights." Justice Marshall, who had joined the Roe majority, also identified the "right to
marry" as a fundamental right deserving fourteenth amendment protection in Zablocki v.
Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384-86 (1978). In Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 95-96 (1986), Justice
O'Connor extended the holding in Zablocki to prison inmates, concluding that there is a "con-
stitutionally protected marital relationship in the prison context." Id. at 96. (The Turner
court, however, did not apply a compelling state interest test, finding that "even under the
reasonable relationship test, the marriage regulation [did] not withstand scrutiny." Id. at 97.
See also Clark v. Jeter, 108 S. Ct. 1910, 1914-16 (1988) (Justice O'Connor, for a unanimous
court, applied intermediate scrutiny in striking down Pennsylvania's 6-year limitations period
for child support actions involving illegitimate children.). Justice White, writing for the major-
ity in Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which the Court refused to find that homo-
sexuals have a fundamental right to engage in consensual sexual relations, nonetheless
accepted the line of decisions that defined the privacy rights conferred by the Constitution. Id.
at 190. Recently, Justice Scalia, in an opinion upholding the imposition of the death penalty
on a 16-year-old and a 17-year-old offender under Stanford v. Kentucky, 109 S. Ct. 2969
(1989), reiterated that the Court uses " 'evolving standards of decency,' " id. at 2974 (quoting
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)), while interpreting the Amendment " 'in a flexible and
dynamic manner,' " (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 171 (1976)). He added that "in
determining what standards have 'evolved' [in the present case], we have looked [to the con-
ceptions of decency] of modern American society as a whole." Id. at 2974. Justice Stevens,
who was also a member of the Roe majority, clarified his support for the interest in liberty in
his concurrence in Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians, 476 U.S. 747, 773-82
(1986). While the dissenting Justice White denied that a woman has a fundamental right to
choose an abortion over childbirth, Justice Stevens stated that he believes that the liberty inter-
est "is significantly broader than Justice White does," id. at 772, and unequivocally affirmed
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those principles" 'so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people
as to be ranked as fundamental.' ",42 In Moore v. City of East Cleve-
land,43 in a plurality opinion, Justice Powell, joined by Justices Brennan,
Marshall, and Blackmun, argued that the Court could conduct the ap-
propriate inquiry. Justice Powell urged that "limits on substantive due
process come [from] careful 'respect for the teachings of history [and]
solid recognition of the basic values that underlie our society.' "" But
many academic commentators, with Judge Bork being one of the most
visible, have steadfastly refused to accept any substantive development of
the Bill of Rights.
Judge Bork, however, implicitly accepts the lesson of Griswold when
he argues that the American flag can be protected by Congress. In effect,
Judge Bork has found the American flag to be one of those principles
" 'so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to be ranked
as fundamental.'""' Although Judge Bork finds no shadow cast by the
Bill of Rights, he readily accepts the shadow cast by Article I. As for the
dangers of "substantive due power," Judge Bork apparently agrees with
Justice Powell's statement in Moore that limits come from "careful 're-
spect for the teachings of history [and] solid recognition of the basic val-
ues that underlie our society.' "46 For example, in singling out the flag
for special treatment, Judge Bork observed as follows:
The national flag is different from other symbols. Nobody pledges
allegiance to the Presidential seal or salutes when it goes by.
Marines did not fight their way up Mount Suribachi on Iwo Jima
that the post-conception decision to bear a child is an individual decision in one of the "sensi-
tive areas of liberty" protected by the Constitution, id. at 777.
Justice Kennedy supported a broad interpretation of the Constitution during the hearing
for his Supreme Court nomination before the Senate Judiciary Committee. In response to
questions by committee member Senator Patrick J. Leahy, Justice Kennedy said, "I think that
the concept of liberty in the due process clause is quite expansive, quite sufficient to protect the
values of privacy that Americans legitimately think are part of their constitutional heritage."
Nomination of Anthony M. Kennedy to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United
States: Hearings Before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 165
(1987). Nonetheless, witnesses who spoke in opposition to Justice Kennedy's nomination
questioned his belief in individual rights. Molly Yard, president of the National Organization
of Women, based her criticism on his decisions on the Court of Appeals of the Ninth Circuit.
For example, she stated that Justice Kennedy's support for the right of privacy in Beller v.
Middendorf, 632 F.2d 788 (1980), was easily superseded by governmental interests. Nomina-
tion of Anthony M. Kennedy: Hearings, supra, at 358.
42. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).
43. 431 U.S. 494 (1977).
44. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (quoting Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 501 (1965)
(Harlan, J., concurring)).
45. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
46. Moore, 431 U.S. at 503 (quoting Griswold, 381 U.S. at 501 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
Winter 1990] REFLECTIONS ON THE FLAG PROTECTION ACT 363
to raise a copy of the Constitution on a length of pipe. Nor did
forty-eight states and the United States enact these laws to protect
these symbols from desecration.47
Perhaps it is too late to doubt the Court's mandate to protect certain
fundamental principles not enumerated in the Constitution. The Consti-
tution simply cannot provide concrete answers to the sundry problems
for which we consult its hallowed words. Hence, the issue is not whether
the Constitution should be supplemented, but rather which of its sections
require supplementing and what values qualify as supplements. I shall
not attempt to address these questions exhaustively. My present goal is
more modest, limited to a brief discussion of whether the body of the
Constitution should be treated differently from the amendments and
whether flag protection is a fundamental value within the penumbra of
Article I.
L Interpreting the Text Consistently with the Amendments
The Bill of Rights was conceived as a counterbalance to the powers
of the federal government. In 1789 the Bill of Rights was a virtual nul-
lity because the founders interpreted the principle of enumerated powers
literally.4" Hence, the power of the federal government was not substan-
tial, limited to only a few spheres of activity, and the Bill of Rights had
little more than symbolic importance. At least since the time of Gibbons
v. Ogden,4 9 however, the power of the national government has been in-
terpreted broadly and today we typically fail even to consider the basis
for Congress' power to legislate. The original balance struck between the
text and the amendments of the Constitution thus changed with increas-
ingly expansive interpretations of federal power; in order to re-establish
that balance, life had to be breathed into the Bill of Rights. Indeed, in
order to remain faithful to the original structure of the document, the
Bill of Rights has to expand in proportion to the constitutional text.
Proponents of federal legislation protecting the flag must rely on a
very broad interpretation of Article I. Without such a theory, Congress
does not have the authority to legislate in this area. It is of course ironic
that many of these proponents adamantly oppose similarly broad con-
structions of the Bill of Rights. But the balance between the text and the
amendments is too closely calibrated to allow different modes of interpre-
tation. As the sword of government authority enlarges, so must the
shield protecting individual liberty. Thus, the task of identifying those
47. R. BORK, supra note 29, at 128.
48. THE FEDERALIST, supra note 20, at 156.
49. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).
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principles " 'so rooted in the tradition and conscience of our people as to
be ranked as fundamental' "50 should be the same in Article I as it is in
the Bill of Rights.5
2. Is Flag Protection a Fundamental Value?
Strictly as a matter of Congress' Article I power, to adjudge the
American flag a fundamental principle is unremarkable. From the dawn
of the American Republic the stars and stripes has symbolized the his-
tory and aspirations of the nation.52 Judge Bork is certainly correct in
finding special significance in the American flag above and beyond other
cherished symbols. And notwithstanding Justice Brennan's concern over
the limits of Congress' power to protect symbols, the flag's distinctive
features justify finding such power in Article I. Implicitly relying on a
fundamental values analysis, the Senate Judiciary Committee quoted Jus-
tice Holmes, in a history of Chief Justice John Marshall, as follows:
The flag is but a bit of bunting to one who insists on prose. Yet,
thanks to Marshall and the men of his generation-and for this
above all we celebrate him and them-its red is our lifeblood, its
stars our world, its blue our heaven. It owns our land. At will it
throws away our lives.53
As long as proponents of flag protection accept a broad theory of
constitutional interpretation, the Act appears to withstand a challenge
under Article I. Protection of the national flag is one of those fundamen-
tal interests identifiable within the penumbra of Article I and probably to
50. Palko, 302 U.S. at 325 (quoting Snyder, 291 U.S. at 105).
51. It might even be argued that the structure of the Constitution mandates a stricter
interpretation of Article I than of the Bill of Rights. Whereas the original concept of the text
of the Constitution limited federal power to those spheres specifically enumerated in Article I,
the Bill of Rights appears to sweep more broadly and is written in more expansive prose than
Article I. But the original view perceived the Bill of Rights more narrowly, directed solely to
check federal excess. At least in 1789, Article I and the Bill of Rights were in balance and
should have been interpreted in a parallel manner.
Of course, the nature of the American Republic is very different today, and through the
very broad language of the Fourteenth Amendment much of the Bill of Rights now applies to
the states. The original balance has thus been altered, at least as regards the greater issue of
identifying an overarching theory of constitutional interpretation. In regard to federal power,
however, no reason presents itself for not maintaining the original balance. In any case, the
effect of applying the Bill of Rights to the states creates a sufficient complication to take the
greater issue outside of the scope of this short Essay. This question merits attention and I hope
to return to it at another time.
52. See 8 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 464 (Rule 16) (Philadelphia
1777).
53. S. REP. No. 152, 101st Cong., Ist Sess. 2 (1989) (quoting O.W. Holmes, John Mar-
shall (1901), in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 266, 270-71 (1920)).
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be found, ultimately, within the Necessary and Proper Clause.54 This
conclusion does not mean, however, that the First Amendment does not
place a check on this power, nor does it mean that Congress ought to
wield that power. The first issue, the Act's constitutionality under the
First Amendment, is beyond the scope of the present Essay.5" As for the
second question, the Essay began with concern over Congress' reluctance
to confront majority caprice. It concludes, therefore, by considering the
wisdom of protecting the flag, by legislation or constitutional amend-
ment, from the fires of political dissent.
III. Conclusion: The Wisdom of Protecting the Flag
Without doubt, an American flag burned in hatred prompts in the
hearts of most Americans a similar sentiment against the dissenter. So
often, as with the Nazis who marched in Skokie, those who take shelter
in the First Amendment are those who hold its protections in contempt.
But the genius of the Constitution lies in its indifference to the individ-
ual's cause; our scheme of government does not sacrifice individuals for
the satisfaction of the majority. It is not only the Nazis who need protec-
tion, as little as they deserve it, but every one of us might have occasion
to invoke the patronage of the Bill of Rights.
Frequently enough in our history dissenters might have fought
against government oppression by using the burning flag as the ultimate
symbol of patriotism. Surely, as the Court observed in Johnson, the
framers did not hold the Union Jack in reverance5 6 Burning the Ameri-
54. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat) 316 (1819); see also Smith v. Goguen,
415 U.S. 566, 586 (1974) (White, J., concurring) ("Congress may provide for the general wel-
fare, control interstate commerce, provide for the common defense, and exercise any powers
necessary and proper for those ends. These powers, and the inherent attributes of sovereignty
as well, surely encompass the designation and protection of a flag.").
55. The first two courts to consider the constitutionality of the Flag Protection Act invali-
dated it on first amendment grounds. United States v. Eichmann, No. CR89-0419 (D.D.C.
March 5, 1990) WL 23807; United States v. Haggerty, No. CR89-315R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21,
1990) WL 26813. Of special note in Eichmann is the court's discussion of the argument the
United States House of Representatives made before it. According to the court, "[t]he House
claims that the government seeks to protect the state's sovereign interest in the flag .... The
House argues that 'while the public may generally look to the flag for symbolizing values such
as patriotism . . . the government has in the flag an incident of sovereignty, with definite
concrete legal significance.'" Eichmann, WL 23807 at 13-14 (quoting Motion of thd Speaker
and Leadership Group of the U.S. House of Representatives in Opposition to Defendants'
Motion to Dismiss, at 3). The court, however, did not discuss the authority for the Apt's
passage in light of the sovereignty interest, but instead limited its analysis to rejecting the
House's claim that the sovereignty interest rendered the Act content-neutral and thus not
subject to strict scrutiny. Id. at 14.
56. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
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can flag following Dred Scott 57 or Korematsu,58 or during the McCarthy
witchhunts, would have demonstrated the highest allegiance to the en-
during values of this Nation. Today's dissent has often proved itself to be
tomorrow's consensus. Many of this Nation's greatest victories, such as
the battles for civil rights and equality for women, were fought against
the "tyranny of the majority." Sometimes these battles demand ex-
traordinary means.
Chief Justice Rehnquist in his Johnson dissent argued that "the
American flag has occupied a unique position as the symbol of our Na-
tion, a uniqueness that justifies a governmental prohibition against flag
burning."59 But the flag's uniqueness also makes political dissent di-
rected at it uniquely potent. A nation's commitment to freedom of
speech is measured by the intensity of the dissent it tolerates. In West
Virginia State Board v. Barnette,60 Justice Jackson explained the lesson
well: "[F]reedom to differ is not limited to things that do not matter
much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. The test of its sub-
stance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of the existing
order."61
Chief Justice Rehnquist also pointed to the Americans who have
fought and died defending the flag in order to illustrate the special place
the flag occupies in this Nation.62 But it was not the flag that so many
died to defend; it was the Nation and its principles. Although the flag is
a powerful symbol of all this Nation stands for, it is still only a symbol.
Ironically, the flag as a symbol incorporates the principle that potentially
leads to its own physical destruction. But whatever number of flags are
burned, the flames consume only the corporeal object; the history, tradi-
tions, hopes, and dreams the flag embodies cannot be so easily destroyed.
Indeed, the values that the flag symbolizes are more likely to be laid to
ashes by the lack of fortitude demonstrated by this country's leaders than
by the burning of American flags in dissent. In protecting a symbol, in
elevating form over substance, the flag may be protected, but a principle
is lost.
The abhorence most feel toward flag burning, coupled with the
political advantages legislators gain by forbidding such action, creates an
imminent danger of crippling an enduring principle of this nation. Toc-
queville saw the tranquilizing effect public opinion has on a democracy's
57. Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
58. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
59. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
60. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
61. Id. at 642.
62. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2550-51.
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leaders. He observed in 1831 that "[i]n that immense crowd which
throngs the avenues to power in the United States, I found very few...
who displayed that ... candor and.., independence of opinion which
frequently distinguished the Americans in former times, and which con-
stitutes the leading feature in distinguished characters wheresoever they
may be found."16 3 It remains to be seen whether the leaders of today can
match the independence of opinion of the leaders who implanted the
principle of freedom of speech in this nation's law.
63. TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1, at 267.

Pure Symbols and the First Amendment
By CALVIN R. MASSEY*
When people converse in a common language, mutual understand-
ing is the usual result. To be sure, miscommunication does occur
through confusion on the part of the speaker, employment of terms that
carry different meanings to speaker and auditor, inattention, and a host
of other human failings that add up to ambiguity. Literary deconstruc-
tionists go so far as to claim that all language is indeterminate,' and
wrestle over the possibility of shared meaning in any given community'
If such difficulties are encountered in ordinary speech, one might suppose
the task of divining meaning to be even more uncertain when symbols are
employed as communicative devices. A moment's reflection, however,
will suggest that the problems are quite similar. Consider the swastika:
emblem of Nazi hatred or Buddhist mandala? A symbol, like a word, is
not a "crystal, transparent and unchanged; ... [but] the skin of a living
thought[,] and may vary greatly in color and content according to the
circumstances and the time in which it is used." 3 Despite the vagaries of
language as a communicative medium, communication occurs through
its use. Perhaps symbols, even more than words, contain a distilled clar-
ity that overcomes the ordinary difficulties of communication, and facili-
tates mutual understanding.
Consider the American flag, a symbol adopted by the nation's gov-
ernment for the purpose of sending some message to the community. Or
consider a crucifix, creche, or menorah-symbols laden with particular
religious meaning. What is the message conveyed by these symbols?
* Associate Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of the Law.
B.A. 1969, Whitman College; M.B.A. 1971, Harvard University; J.D. 1974, Columbia Univer-
sity. I am grateful to the participants in the 1989 Hastings Colloquia on the Supreme Court's
October 1988 Term, at which an earlier version of these thoughts was presented.
1. For a general survey of the issue, see Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L.
REV. 127 (1984).
2. See, eg., J. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING: CONSTITUTIONS AND
RECONSTRUCTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY (1984); S. FISH, Is
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980);
White, Law as Language: Reading Law and Reading Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 415 (1982);
Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEx. L. REV. 551
(1982).
3. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
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What consequences flow from the fact that it is a government that
chooses to speak through the symbol? May a government mandate that
its symbolic speech remain a soliloquy or, once the speech has been ut-
tered, does the community of auditors aquire a right to reply in kind?
Both Texas v. Johnson,4 last term's flag-burning case, and County of Alle-
gheny v. American Civil Liberties Union,5 which considered the govern-
mental establishment of religion implicit in official display of a cr6che
and menorah, asked and answered these questions, albeit implicitly. It is
my intention here to render more explicit the Court's resolution of these
issues and, along the way, to speculate upon the emotional explosion that
Johnson evoked and its meaning to freedom of speech.6
I. The Flag and Free Speech
During the 1984 Republican National Convention, Gregory John-
son publicly burned an American flag as part of a political demonstration
both protesting the Reagan Administration and condemning the United
States. Johnson was subsequently convicted of desecration of a venerated
object, an offense that required proof of Johnson's knowing or intentional
physical mistreatment of the flag "in a way that the actor knows will
seriously offend one or more persons likely to observe or discover his
action." 7 His conviction was overturned by the Texas Court of Criminal
Appeals on the ground that application of the Texas "desecration" stat-
ute to Johnson's flag-burning violated the speech clause of the First
Amendment.' The United States Supreme Court affirmed.9
In its appeal to the Supreme Court, Texas conceded that Johnson's
4. 109 S. Ct. 2533 (1989).
5. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
6. When "freedom of speech" is mentioned, most Americans reflexively think of the
First Amendment. U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law ... abridging the
freedom of speech .. "). By the incorporation doctrine this guarantee has long been enforced
against the states. See. e.g., Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U.S. 380 (1927). But even prior to adoption
of the Constitution the states provided their own independent guarantees of freedom of speech.
See, e.g., Pennsylvania's 1776 Constitution ("the people have a right to freedom of speech"). 5
THE FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS, COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC
LAWS 3081-92 (F. Thorpe ed. 1909); 8 SOURCES AND DOCUMENTS OF UNITED STATES CON-
STITUTIONS 277-85 (W. Swindler ed. 1979). These guarantees continue to exist independently
of the federal Constitution and carry different substantive meaning. See, e.g., People ex reL
Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 68 N.Y.2d 553, 503 N.E.2d 492, 510 N.Y.S.2d 844 (1986) (inter-
preting the free speech provision of New York's Constitution more expansively than the
United States Supreme Court has interpreted the federal analogue).
7. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.09(b) (Vernon 1989).
8. Johnson v. Texas, 755 S.W.2d 92 (Tex. Crim. 1988).
9. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2548.
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conduct was expression, 10 which brought the case squarely within the
framework erected by the Court to test the limits of governmental con-
trol of symbolic speech. Most important, of course, is the four-part test
of United States v. O'Brien," which permits governmental regulation of
the "non-speech" or "conduct" element of symbolic speech if the govern-
ment can first establish an interest for the regulation that is strong, legiti-
mate, and not related to suppression of the speech element. 2 Texas
offered two interests as sufficient legitimate interests unrelated to sup-
pression of the speech element of Johnson's flag-burning; both were ulti-
mately rejected, although for slightly different reasons.
Texas contended that its governmental interest in preventing
breaches of the peace was sufficiently legitimate and unrelated to sup-
pression of speech to uphold Johnson's conviction under the desecration
statute. The problem with this argument was two-fold. First, there al-
ready existed another Texas statute forbidding breach of the peace' 3 that
could have readily accomplished Texas' stated objective. The desecra-
tion statute was thus not necessary, a fact that cast considerable doubt on
the legitimacy of the asserted interest. Second, the interest advanced by
Texas was one that related rather directly to the speech component of
Johnson's flag-burning. Stripped of its rhetorical husk, the argument ad-
vanced by Texas was that the state could "ban the expression of certain
disagreeable ideas on the unsupported presumption that their very disa-
greeableness will provoke violence."' 4 In order to prevail on this theory,
Texas would have had to establish that Johnson's flag-burning either fell
within the narrow category of fighting words "likely to provoke the aver-
age person to retaliation, and thereby cause a breach of the peace"' 5 or
was "directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and was
likely to incite or produce such action."' 6 Texas was unable to carry this
burden; indeed, it appeared not even to try very hard, for it claimed that
the Chaplinsky and Brandenburg standards were satisfied merely by a
showing of possible violence."7 Predictably, the Court concluded that
10. Id.
11. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
12. Id. at 377.
13. TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 42.01 (Vernon 1989). The statute prohibits, among other
actions, the use of "abusive, indecent, profane, or vulgar language," § (a)(1), and offensive
gestures or displays that tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace, § (a)(2).
14. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542.
15. Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 574 (1942).
16. Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
17. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2542 (Texas argued "that it need only demonstrate 'thepoten-
tial for a breach of the peace.' ") (quoting Brief for Petitioner at 37) (emphasis added).
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possibility was simply not enough."8
Texas also claimed that its interest in preserving the flag as a symbol
of nationhood and national unity was sufficiently legitimate and unre-
lated to suppression of Johnson's expression to bring the desecration stat-
ute within the lenient remainder of the O'Brien test.19 The problem with
this contention is that Texas' claimed interest-maintaining the integrity
of the flag as symbol-is precisely coterminous with the expression that
inheres in destroying that symbol as a means of negating its symbolic
message. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Johnson was "outside
of O'Brien's test altogether."2 But that, of course, did not end the in-
quiry, for even outside of O'Brien the state's asserted interest might be
sufficient if it could survive "the most exacting scrutiny" applied to stat-
utes that prohibit speech that has a specified emotive impact on the audi-
ence.21 Texas' interest failed that scrutiny because it sought to maintain
a governmental monopoly on the flag as a medium of symbolic speech.
The Court stated, "If we were to hold that a State may forbid flag-burn-
ing wherever it is likely to endanger the flag's symbolic role, but allow it
wherever burning a flag promotes that role ... we would be saying that
* . . the flag... may be used as a symbol ... only in one direction."22
This is the core of the matter. The flag is a virtually pure symbol:
its meaning (and utilitarian function) is almost totally symbolic. Any
nonsymbolic function of a pure symbol is so slight as to be overshadowed
by the symbolic message. The flag is ordinarily used only as a symbol.
When imagining its use as a dustrag, or a seatcover, or a window curtain,
one is hard-pressed to extinguish the emotional overtones of its symbolic
message. As Marshall McLuhan would have put it, the medium is the
message. When a symbol possesses no significant meaning apart from its
symbolic message, its physical integrity (the medium) cannot be pro-
tected without simultaneously both protecting its message and sup-
pressing the symbolic message of disagreement implicit in destruction of
the symbol. In this the flag is almost sui generis.
To understand more fully, consider the more usual case of a "mixed
symbol," one that carries a symbolic message but also performs utilita-
rian functions that are not message-carrying. A Mercedes-Benz, for ex-




21. Boos v. Barry, 485 U.S. 312, 321 (1988). In Boos the Court struck down a District of
Columbia ordinance that prohibited public display of signs within 500 feet of embassies if the
sign would bring the foreign government into "public odium" or "public disrepute."
22. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2546.
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simultaneously performs the prosaic function of transport. The United
States Capitol or the White House may each be a symbol of the nation
(or prominent political aspects thereof) but the buildings also perform
the more mundane functions of office space, housing, assembly, and mu-
seum. To prohibit the destruction of the White House is quite justifiable,
even when the bomber is acting out of a sincere desire to deliver a strong
symbolic message, since the collateral (and nonsymbolic) aspects of the
White House provide a nonspeech-related governmental interest in
prohibiting the symbolic speech implicit in destruction of the symbol.
The O'Brien test is a recognition of this fact, although it does not employ
the usage of mixed or pure symbols.
By contrast, when pure symbols-those in which the symbol's cor-
poreal existence is necessarily fused with the message it conveys-are
protected by governments from physical assault, the government will be
unable to advance an interest unrelated to speech because no such inter-
est exists. To put it slightly differently, since pure symbols carry
messages-and only carry messages-governments may not stop the con-
versation once one opinion has been uttered by exhibition of the sym-
bol.23 When the arena of speech lies wholly in the realm of the purely
symbolic, reply in kind is not only to be expected but deserves preserva-
tion, lest the guarantee of freedom of speech stop at the frontier of lan-
guage and symbol.
Does this mean that some future Gregory Johnson is entitled to
bomb the Washington Monument, or to ignite his American flag in a
town square pungent with leaking natural gas? Hardly. Consider the
cases separately. The Washington Monument is possibly not a pure sym-
bol, for its function as a tourist attraction arguably overshadows its sym-
bolic message of remembrance of President Washington. In the realm of
the mixed symbol, an easy case can be made for a governmental interest
unrelated to speech-public safety-sufficient to prohibit destruction of
23. It might be argued that this doctrine would prevent governmentally established and
enforced monopolies in areas such as trademarks, since a trademark has a purely symbolic
commercial message. The case of a commercial symbol and the extent of its protection against
commercial invasion is quite different from the issue raised by parody of a trademark for
wholly political, and noncommercial, purposes. Since trademark parodies undertaken as a
means of artistic expression are entitled to some free speech protection, even when commercial
gain may be an object, political parodies undertaken for no commercial advantage would seem
presumptively protected by the First Amendment. See, eg., Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing Group, Inc., 886 F.2d 490 (2d Cir. 1989); Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875
F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989) (commercial and artistically expressive trademark parodies subjected
to a balancing of consumer confusion and first amendment interests). Under this rationale,
San Francisco Arts & Athletics v. United States Olympic Comm., 483 U.S. 522 (1987), which
upheld a congressionally established monopoly on the use of the term "Olympic," is a prosaic
example of protecting a trademark from commercial exploitation by rivals.
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the symbol. A similar argument can be made to suppress ignition of the
flag in a cloud of natural gas. While in this case the flag is no less pure
symbol, the collateral consequences of the symbolic speech are so large as
to permit prohibition. This example is not materially different from the
long-recognized set of circumstances that permit suppression of speech
that is likely to produce imminent lawless action,2' or that permit reason-
able regulation of the time, place, and manner of speech.25 Thus, the
destruction of pure symbols, like any other form of symbolic speech, is
ultimately subject to the same content-neutral, conduct-focusing stan-
dards applicable to all speech.
By contrast, the dissent's approach to the problem of governmental
protection of pure symbols was both to broaden ominously the "fighting
words" exemption from free speech26 and to endorse suppression of sym-
bolic speech so long as other means of speech are left open. Seizing upon
Chaplinsky's observation that "fighting words" are "no essential part of
any exposition of ideas,"27 Chief Justice Rehnquist argued that flag-burn-
ing also was no essential part of any exposition of ideas.s To the extent
this passage may be taken to mean that content and form are separable-
and thus that the state should be permitted to insist upon an undisturb-
ing form of the message-it is readily evident that the premise upon
which the dissent forms its judgment is simply not there. For in the case
of pure symbols, both form and content, and medium and message are
bonded into a single undifferentiated mass. Either the dissent failed to
understand this point or, fully understanding it, was willing to embark
upon the uncharted and stormy seas of content regulation. If that was
indeed the dissent's ambition, the dissenters owed us a glimpse of the test
they would employ to filter acceptable content from the unacceptable.
This they failed to do, although they did suggest that such prohibitions
would be acceptable if they left the symbolic speaker with other modes of
symbolic speech and the usual verbal forms of expression.29 But, once
again, this is an approach that fails in the world of pure symbols, for the
protected symbol carries a message unique to its status as a combined
object and message. Response to that unique message may be fully possi-
ble only via the same combination of medium and message, since pure
symbols are apt to be highly charged emotive devices.
24. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969).
25. See United States v. Grace, 461 U.S. 171, 177 (1983).
26. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942).
27. Id.
28. Johnson, 109 S. Ct. at 2553 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
29. Id. at 2554.
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The high emotional pitch of pure symbols-whether flag, crucifix,
or some other device-complicates considerations of free speech in a dia-
logue of symbol and its destruction. But the issue is even more compli-
cated by the fact that Texas v. Johnson involved a meeting between two
symbols: the pure symbol of the flag and the increasingly refined and
pure symbol of free speech. Dean Lee Bollinger has argued that free
speech requires a society that professes to protect it to allow the most
distasteful ideas to be aired, in order to cultivate the virtues of tolerance
and self-restraint." Cultivation of these virtues may be important in and
of themselves, but Bollinger suggests that "toleration of undesirable and
unwanted behavior ... [illumines] troublesome tendencies within those
wishing to be intolerant, often by the community's engaging in self-re-
straint toward the very behavior it seeks to avoid."'" Tolerating abhor-
rent speech permits us to identify our biases, and perhaps enables us to
purge ourselves of hidden intolerance. Paradoxically, societal growth
and even transformation are accomplished by tolerating the conduct we
seek to extirpate.
This paradox may be understood best by drawing an example from
humanistic psychology. Carl Jung posited that within every person lies a
"shadow," a largely unconscious and morally uncontrollable collection
of archetypal primitive emotions, judgments, and impulses that function
as a dark side to every personality.32 The shadow has a tendency to es-
cape recognition because it is usually projected onto some other person.
Hence, when a person loathes someone else it may well be that the loath-
ing is really of one's own unrecognized evil.33 It is the rare person who
moves beyond stubborn resistance to recognition of this projection, but
once a person has done so-and faced "the relative evil of his na-
ture"3 -- he has begun the process of transforming and transcending his
inner demon.
From a societal perspective, toleration of ugly speech, whether racist
epithet or burning flag, may be the avenue to recognition of our collective
shadow, the first step in its eventual voluntary extirpation by transforma-
tion. The intolerant impulse-banning racist speech or flag-burning-
may have counterproductive long-term results, for it enables the society
to tell itself (smugly and falsely) that it has no problem; the problem lies
within those horrid offenders whom we have righteously muzzled. Pro-
30. See generally L. BOLLINGER, THE TOLERANT SOCIETY: FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND
EXTREMIST SPEECH IN AMERICA (1986).
31. Id. at 238.
32. C. JUNG, THE PORTABLE JUNG 144-48 (J. Campbell ed. 1971).
33. Id. at 146.
34. Id. at 148.
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jection of our evil onto others in order to escape recognition of it in our-
selves is as common to societies as individuals.
When free speech is viewed as a symbol of the aspirations of a com-
munity to tolerance, the grating deviations from our customary norms
test the limits of our aspiration and our commitment to the symbolic
ideal. Fidelity to free speech becomes the miner's canary of our aspira-
tion to tolerance." Thus it assumes a symbolic importance of its own,
quite transcendent of the value of speech it preserves. Free speech is
both a tangible doctrine to secure the open marketplace of ideas we re-
vere, and a placeholder for societal hopes that go far beyond speech it-
self-indeed, which go to the vision of meaning we have for our society.
When free speech is elevated to a plane of such symbolic importance, its
invocation in the dimension of flag-burning represents an intersection of
highly charged emotional vectors. Pure symbols, like pure hydrogen, are
volatile.
It is therefore hardly surprising that the reaction to Texas v. Johnson
has been so vehement. The call for a constitutional amendment, while
not ended, has been considerably muted.36 Nevertheless, the "Flag Pro-
tection Act of 1989" 1 has become law, and has spawned almost immedi-
ate arrests for flag-burning.38 The issue will thus be revisited by the
Court, for the recent Act prohibits the knowing mutilation of the flag,
without regard to the emotive impact of the act upon any particular audi-
ence.39 In Johnson redux, the Court will be forced to consider the limits
of its commitment to the logic of pure symbols. If the purely symbolic
nature of the flag is the crux of Johnson, the Court will likely find the
35. Before the advent of sophisticated systems to measure the levels of coal gas in mines,
coal miners brought canaries into the shafts to test for presence of the deadly gas. The canaries
were more sensitive than humans; when the birds died, the miners were warned to evacuate.
My colleague Brian Gray brought this metaphor to my attention.
36. The Senate rejected a proposed amendment on October 19, 1989. See N.Y. Times,
October 20, 1989, at Al, col. 1 (late ed.).
37. PUB. L. No. 101-131, 1989 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs (103 Stat.) 777 (to be
codified at 18 U.S.C. § 700).
38. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1989, at A25, col. 1 (late ed.). Among those arrested for burning
a flag on the steps of the U.S. Capitol was none other than Gregory Johnson. The next day,
formal charges under the Flag Protection Act were filed against Johnson's three compatriots,
but not against Johnson. S.F. Chronicle, Nov. 1, 1989, at A18, col. 1.
The first judicial decision finding the Flag Protection Act unconstitutional was United
States v. Haggerty, No. CR89-315R (W.D. Wash. Feb. 21, 1990) LEXIS 1652, which invali-
dated the Act as applied to persons who burned the flag as part of a political protest.
39. The Act also requires immediate certification to the United States Supreme Court of
the question of the constitutionality of the Act, and mandates that the Supreme Court accept
jurisdiction and expedite decision.
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1989 "Flag Protection Act" invalid.' A contrary decision may send
more mixed signals. Prudential conservation of the First Amendment
from radical pruning by overwrought legislators may dictate judicial con-
fusion of pure symbols and conduct, albeit at some considerable cost to
the symbolic and substantive values imbedded in free speech. Or the
Court may simply not be as wedded to the fusion of message and symbol
as its Johnson opinion implies. We shall see.
II. Religious Symbols and the Establishment of Religion
Disagreement among the Justices in Johnson focused not on what
the government said through the symbolic medium of its flag, but on the
significance to free speech of the statement. In County of Allegheny v.
American Civil Liberties Union,4 the government also spoke through
symbols, but the Court was divided over what was said. During the
Christmas season, the Allegheny County Courthouse displayed a creche
surrounded by poinsettias. The creche was owned by the local Roman
Catholic diocese, which fact was duly noted in the display, and occupied
about one-half of the main staircase. One block away, the Pittsburgh city
government displayed an eighteen-foot privately owned menorah on the
outside of its municipal offices and a forty-five-foot decorated Christmas
tree next to the menorah. The Court concluded that display of the
cr6che violated the Establishment Clause42 but display of the menorah
did not.
In both instances the government spoke through the use of religious
symbols, but a shifting coalition of Justices, pivoting upon Justices Black-
mun and O'Connor, found greater significance for the Establishment
Clause in the message communicated via the creche than in that trans-
mitted through the menorah. Justices Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens
(the "secularists") joined Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in invalidat-
ing the cr6che but dissented from their judgment upholding display of
the menorah. Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, Kennedy, and White (the "ac-
40. In United States v. Haggerty, supra note 38, Judge Barbara Rothstein concluded that
the governmental interests advanced in support of the Act were related to the suppression of
expression precisely because the government employed the flag as a symbol. A Cook County
(Chicago) Circuit Court judge has also read Texas v. Johnson in this fashion, relying upon it to
strike down Chicago's ordinance banning flag desecration. Judge Kenneth Gillis enjoined en-
forcement of the Chicago ordinance, finding that it had a "deterrent effect on freedom of ex-
pression" and noting that "[w]hen the flag is displayed in a way to convey ideas, such display is
protected by the First Amendment." N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1989, at B7, col. 4. (late ed.).
41. 109 S. Ct. 3086 (1989).
42. U.S. CONsT. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion ...."). The Establishment Clause has bound the states via the Fourteenth Amend-
ment's Due Process Clause since Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947).
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commodationists") joined Justices Blackmun and O'Connor in uphold-
ing the menorah but dissented from the creche decision. Because the
effective balance of power on this issue was held by the centrist alliance
of Justices Blackmun and O'Connor, it is important to understand the
fashion in which they parse the establishment clause meaning of govern-
mental use of religious symbols.
Modern establishment clause jurisprudence begins with Lemon v.
Kurtzman43 and unravels shortly thereafter. Under Lemon, a govern-
mental action survives scrutiny if it has a secular purpose, if its effect
(regardless of purpose) neither advances nor inhibits religion, and if it
does not involve excessive "entanglement" of government and religion.'
In the context of governmental displays of religious symbols during De-
cember, the most recent word prior to Allegheny was Lynch v. Don-
nelly,45 in which the Court upheld municipal display of a creche
surrounded by various secular symbols of the season including Santa
Claus and his fabled reindeer. Unfortunately, as Justice Blackmun can-
didly observed in Allegheny, "[t]he rationale of the majority opinion in
Lynch is none too clear." 46
More lucid to Justice Blackmun was Justice O'Connor's Lynch con-
currence, in which she sought to focus inquiry on whether the govern-
ment had made "adherence to a religion relevant in any way to a person's
standing in the political community."'47 In Justice O'Connor's view, gov-
ernments might do this in one or both of two ways: by entanglement
with religion to such an extent that government loses its independence
from religion, or by governmental "endorsement or disapproval of reli-
gion [that] ... sends a message to the non-adherents [or religious believ-
ers] that they are outsiders, not full members of the political
community. ' 48 Justice Blackmun stitched together the common reason-
ing of Justice O'Connor and the four Lynch dissenters in order to con-
clude that governmental use of religious symbols violates the
Establishment Clause if "it has the effect of endorsing religious beliefs."49
But "the effect of the government's use of religious symbolism depends
upon its context." 50
43. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
44. Id. at 612-13 (quoting Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970)).
45. 465 U.S. 668 (1984).
46. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3101.
47. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 687 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
48. Id. at 688.
49. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3103.
50. Id.
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Applying these principles, Justices Blackmun, O'Connor, and their
allies of the accommodationist block concluded that the menorah was
acceptable because it was part of a pluralistic, and partially secular, dis-
play that conveyed a secularized message.51 The purity of the religious
symbol was diluted, both by context (the presence of a larger Christmas
tree and an utterly secular sign saluting liberty) and by the Court's con-
clusion that Chanukah is both a religious and a secular celebration.52
The first point assumes that pure symbols can be diluted--or adulter-
ated-by association with other pure symbols. The presumed effect of
such commingling of symbolic messages is delivery of an ambiguous
message, much like a political candidate responding to inquiry about his
position on abortion by saying "I remain resolutely opposed to abortion,
but steadfastly supportive of a woman's right to undo an unwanted preg-
nancy.""3 Joint display of the United States and Soviet Union flags may
convey a message of friendship, or suggest that the United States is a
communist dictatorship, or imply that the Soviet Union has become a
representative democracy. The meaning of the message lies in the pur-
poses of the exhibitor and the apprehensions of the viewer.
The second point is really a conclusion that the menorah may be a
pure symbol in the sense that its function is almost wholly symbolic, but
the message it carries is mixed, in that it is neither wholly religious nor
entirely secular. Thus, from the perspective of pure symbols, the govern-
mental display of the menorah is a case of speech sufficiently ambiguous
to render its meaning unintelligble. Governments may speak through
religious symbols if we can't understand what they are saying.
The same principles, applied to the creche by Justices Blackmun,
O'Connor, and their secularist allies, resulted in a conclusion that be-
cause its message was a sufficiently clear endorsement of religion, its ef-
fect was to advance religion. This symbol, carrying only a religious
message, was inherently more pure than the menorah, and its context
was not sufficiently diluted. Poinsettias, apparently, are not enough, but
Santa and his reindeer are adequate dilutants. Left for another day are
questions as to the efficacy of elves, mistletoe, and holly sprigs.
It is unfortunate that the Court chose to focus solely on the effect
prong of Lemon, since employment of pure symbols, especially when di-
luted by association with other pure symbols, raises troublesome ques-
51. Id. at 3112-13.
52. Id. at 3112.
53. Taylor, The Abortion Thing, Revisited, S.F. Recorder, Nov. 1, 1989, at 6, col. 2.
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tions about the purpose of such display.54 Suppose that Pittsburgh
exhibited together a creche, a menorah, an image of the Buddha, a copy
of the Koran, and a sign exhorting atheism. Is this sufficient dilution to
satisfy the Allegheny refinement of Lynch and Lemon? If not, would the
whole thing be saved by adding a few Christmas trees and Easter bun-
nies?5" Quite apart from the effect on the viewer of this commingling of
symbols is the question of the government's purpose in choosing such a
combination. Was it to ridicule religion or to express neutrality about
any particular religion? How are we to know? Suppose that the govern-
ment sincerely intended to express neutrality but the message to viewers
was one of governmental hostility?
The secularists would resolve these issues by requiring that govern-
ments completely eschew the use of religious symbols;56 the accommoda-
tionists would tolerate governmental use of religious symbols so long as
they are "[n]on-coercive" and merely a "passive acknowledgment of...
practices that are accepted in our national heritage."57 While these
groups bring widely divergent norms to the task of interpreting the Es-
tablishment Clause, they do agree that religious symbols are pure sym-
bols. For that reason the secularists argue that such symbols should be
forbidden to governments, for their use in isolation delivers a message
that government is not neutral with respect to religion, and their use in
association with other religious or secular symbols risks offense to reli-
gious practitioners, promotes divisiveness within the community, and
fails to communicate neutrality. For the same reason-the purity of the
religious symbol-the accommodationists argue for permitting govern-
mental use, since the message is wholly symbolic, lacking the bite of coer-
cion and carrying only acknowledgment of cultural heritage.
Disagreement centers on the significance to the Establishment Clause of
the pure symbol's message-both that intended to be delivered and that
54. The Court noted that there was no need to review Lemon's purpose or entanglement
tests because those issues were not considered by the court of appeals. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at
3101 n.45. Nevertheless, some illuminating dicta in these directions would have been
welcome.
55. The answer of the secularists is clearly "no." "There can be no doubt that, when
found in . . .[the] company [of religious symbols], the [Christmas] tree. serves as an un-
abashedly religious symbol." Id. at 3126 (Brennan, J., concurring and dissenting).
56. But the secularists would tolerate such direct messages as the motto "In God We
Trust," presumably because we don't. "[S]uch practices as the designation of 'In God We
Trust' as our national motto, or the references to God contained in the Pledge of Allegiance
can best be understood ... as a form of 'ceremonial deism,' protected from establishment
clause scrutiny chiefly because they have lost through rote repetition any significant religious
content." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 716 (1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
57. Allegheny, 109 S. Ct. at 3138 (Kennedy, J., concurring and dissenting).
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actually received-rather than on the message itself or its purely sym-
bolic quality.
The centrists, by contrast, see religious symbols as less pure, particu-
larly when their message is obscured, diluted, or adulterated by associa-
tion with other such symbols. The centrists seem more willing than
either the secularists or the accommodationists to read diffuse and am-
biguous meaning into governmental use of religious symbols. The cen-
trists see a clear distinction "between a specifically Christian symbol, like
a creche, and more general religious references, like the legislative
prayers"58 at issue in Marsh v. Chambers.5 9 Neither the accommodation-
ists nor the secularists see any significant distinction, for establishment
clause purposes, between the messages conveyed in the two cases. But
the centrists do agree that when the message is pure, and purely religious,
its meaning is clear and governments may not transmit it. The debate
between the centrists and both the other camps is over the purity of the
message delivered by religious symbols. The accommodationists and sec-
ularists agree on the purity of the symbolic message but argue about its
significance to the Establishment Clause.
III. Conclusion
The Court has recognized the power of symbolic communication,
and appears to discern the difference between pure symbols (which func-
tion only as communicators and deliver a uniform, clear message), and
mixed symbols (which perform both communicative and other functions,
or which deliver an ambiguous message). But disagreement rages about
the significance to the Constitution of pure symbols. To confound the
problem, only three (and perhaps as many as five) Justices maintained
fully consistent positions in Johnson and Allegheny with respect to both
recognition of pure symbols and their constitutional significance.
Justices Brennan and Marshall both recognize the pure quality of
the symbols at issue and attach constitutional significance to that fact.
Justice Blackmun generally recognizes the purity of the symbols
(although he is more willing to find ambiguity with religious symbols)
and finds constitutional significance in their purity.
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice White either fail to recognize
the flag as pure symbol or attach no constitutional significance to the
ramifications of that fact. 0 Both recognize the purity of religious sym-
58. 109 S. Ct. at 3106.
59. 463 U.S. 783 (1983).
60. See text accompanying notes 23-26.
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bols but find that purity to be of no importance to the Establishment
Clause.
Justices O'Connor and Stevens likewise either fail to recognize the
flag as pure symbol or find no constitutional significance in that purity.
Both recognize the purity of religious symbols (though Justice O'Connor
shares Justice Blackmun's doubts about their purity) but, unlike Justices
Rehnquist and White, they ascribe establishment clause significance to
pure religious symbols.
Justices Scalia and Kennedy are consistent in finding both flags and
religious icons to be pure symbols, but they see significance in that recog-
nition only when it comes to the Free Speech Clause. For these Justices,
perhaps the pure symbolism of free speech is the added ingredient that
leads them to hear the alarm bells of constitutional invalidity when con-
fronted with governmental deployment of a pure symbol in a speech
context, but to hear only silence when similarly pure symbols are used by
governments in an establishment clause context.
These cases are only an early chapter in a new saga of constitutional
development. The intersection of pure symbols with the Free Speech and
Establishment Clauses will see more activity, and we will probably not
have to wait very long for this judicial pot to boil. Unfortunately, it is
considerably more difficult to divine what will come out of the pot.
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